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THE case studies of the fifteen hundred New Jersey and Boston
banl-upts which were made during the last two years' throw
*Visiting Professor of Law, Yale School of Law; co-author of Cases
on the Law of Management of Business Units (1931), Cases and Materials
on the Law of Financing of Business Units (1931) and Cases and
Materials on Corporate Reorganization (1931). '
The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas
and Miss Emma Corstvet for many helpful suggestions and criticisms re-
garding the analysis of cases and presentation of data in this article.
I The study in New Jersey, made from November, 1929-June, 19'0, cov-
ered 597 of the 1275 petitions filed during the fiscal year ended June 00,
1930. The cases studied were taken from all parts of the District of
New Jersey-rural as well as urban, small towns as well as larger cities
and included approximately two-thirds of all those who filed their peti-
tions during the period of the study. The study in Massachusetts in-
cluded 910 of the 2900 (unofficial) petitions filed in the entire District
of Massachusetts for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1931. No attempt was
made to cover the entire state. Only cases arising in the metropolitan
area of Boston, ie., the counties of Suffolk, Norfolk, and Middlesex, were
covered. About 70% of all those cases between October, 1930, and June,
1931, were taken.
The study in New Jersey was carried on with the generous supervision
and collaboration of Hon. William Clark of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. The Boston study was made pos-
sible only because of genuine and whole-hearted cooperation on the part
of the three distinguished Boston referees--Hon. Arthur Black, Hon. B.
Loring Young, and Hon. Charles C. Cabot.
Both the New Jersey and Boston projects were conducted jointly by the
Department of Commerce, the Yale Law School, and the Institute of Human
Relations of Yale University. Dr. W. C. Plummer of the Wharton School
of Commerce represented the Department of Commerce in the New Jersey
study; Mr. Victor Sadd in the Boston study. A report on the New Jersey
study has been made by Dr. Plummer. See Causes of Business Failures
and Bankruptcies of Individuals in New Jersey in 1929-1930, DOMESTic
ColAMuacE SERiES No. 54, Publication of the Department of Commerce
(Gov. Print. Off. 1931). For similar publications by the Department of
Commerce see Credit Extension and Cavses of Failure Among Philadclphia
Grocers, TRADE INF. BuLL. No. 700 (Gov. Print. Off. 1930); Crcdit Excn-
sions and Business Failures, TRADE INF. BuLL. No. 627 (Gov. Print. Off.
1929).
Not all of the cases reported by Dr. Plummer are embraced in this
report, and vice versa. Due to the presence of two field staffs cases were
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some- light upon the functions which the venerable institution
of bankruptcy is performing. The present Act was passed in
18982 and, though amended several times, has never been
changed fundamentally. During the thirty-three years it has
been in force no inventory of its operation has been made. But
little attempt has been made to determine its incidences.4 In
fact without independent investigations that would be practically
impossible, as no provision is made in the system for the col-
lection of vita statistics of bankruptcy. The only data available
are those contained in the annual reports of the attorney-general.
They are practically valueless for even an administrative, let
alone a functional, study of bankruptcy., They reveal little of
occasionally covered separately. In addition the report of Dr. Plummer
covers 42 cases administered by the Friendly Adjustment Bureau of the
North New Jersey Credit Men's Association. For reports on the methods
of investigation see Clark, Douglas and Thomas, Th Business Failures
Project-I. A Problem in Methodology (1930) 39 YALn L. J. 1013; Douglas
and Thomas, The Business Failures Project.-Il. An Analysis of Methods
of Investigation (1931) 40 YAIL L. J. 1034.
2 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
a32 STAT. 797 (1903); 34 STAT. 267 (1906); 36 STAT. 838 (1910); 39
STAT. 999 (1917); 42 STAT. 354 (1922); 44 STAT. 662 (1926).
4 N~teworthy exceptions are the studies made and presently being made
by the Department of Remedial Loans of the Russell Sage Foundation as
to the relation between bankruptcy and consumer credit under the able
direction of Messrs. Leon Henderson and Rolf Nugent; and a cooperative
study of bankruptcy by the University of Chicago and the Department
of Commerce along the lines of the New Jersey and Boston studies. The
Chicago study is being directed by Professor John H. Cover for the
University of Chicago and Mr. Victor Sadd for the Department of Com-
merce.
5 All that the annual reports of the attorney-general contain are the
following:
(1) The number of voluntary and involuntary petitions pending, filed
and concluded during the fiscal year.
(2) The nature of the business of the bankrupts. There aro six head-
ings-farmers, wage earners, merchants, manufacturers, professional and
others. Not only are these vocational groupings too broad and general
but further the group of "others" includes on the average about one-sixth
of the total. For any sociological or economic purpose these data would
be so vague and general as to be of little utility.
(3) Liabilities, divided into unsecured claims on one hand and prior or
secured claims on the other.
(4) Amounts realized on the assets, with separate designation of the
amounts disbursed in conducting the business.
(5) Net assets distributed (a) as fees and expenses of administration
and (b) to creditors.
(6) An analysis of fees and expenses of administration showing in
general to what officers they were paid.
(7) Appraised value of exemptions and of property securing debts.
(8) Number of no-asset cases and total fees and expenses of referees
in connection therewith.
(9) Number of cases filed in forma pauperis.
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the kinds of persons using bankruptcy. No clues are given as to
why they are there. No information is set forth showing what
treatment they obtain-whether they applied for a discharge,
whether the application was contested, whether the discharged
was granted or refused and if refused on what ground. Nothing
is given showing how the various subdivisions of the discharge
section [§ 14 (b)] are working. The deficiencies are as apparent
on the administrative side of bankruptcy, not only as respects
§ 14 but also as respects all other sections of the Act.
Bankruptcy of course has been the subject of much discussion
and investigation during the last generation.( But most of the
energy has been directed (but by no means misdirected) to-
wards detecting fraudulent practices on the part of bankrupts
and lawyers, improving and expediting administration, devis-
ing methods of reducing expenses and increasing returns to
creditors, eliminating the duplication of functions by various
officials, providing more effective creditor control, etc. In other
words, the efforts have been directed largely towards oiling and
greasing the existing machinery without seriously considering
the totally different (though perhaps not more important) engi-
neering problem of the social need, use, and function of the par-
ticular machinery or its parts.
Of course such latter study would be as broad as the life
which bankruptcy touches or affects. Its ramifications through
the social and economic order would be almost endless. It might
suggest basic statutory and administrative changes in the system.
Or it might reveal any number of maladjustments of individuals
to society and suggest a method of attack along educational,
medical, or social lines as corrective measures. Again it might
show the incidence of some particular statute, and furnish data
for an intelligent revision of it, e. g., of a statute permitting as-
signment of wages, which forces wage earners hard pressed by
rapacious creditors to seek bankruptcy as a way out. Or it might
reveal that in respect to certain failures bankruptcy was acting
(10) Separately are given number of indictments and convictions for
the nation as a whole.
In the study by the Department of Justice now being brought to a close
it was found necessary to send to referees throughout the country long
and detailed questionnaires in order to obtain adequate and reliable statis-
tical information respecting the administrative features of the bankruptcy
system.
6 Most significant are the Donovan investigation, conducted for the
most part in New York from 1929-1930, and the study carried on by the
Department of Justice during the last two years under the direction of
Hon. Thomas D. Thacher with the assistance of ir. Lloyd K. Garrison.
The Donovan report is to be found in AmDINISTnATIOx OF B,1Rupr' Es-
TATES-House Committee Print, 71st Congress, 3d Session (Wash. 1931).
The final report on the study by the Department of Justice has not yet
been made public. See 16 A. B. A. J. 641 (1930).
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as a corrective to other pathological conditions, e.g., those exist-
ing in the small loan field, where, in absence of effective legisla-
tion, the necessitous borrower is at the mercy of loan sharks who
exact such a toll that bankruptcy is the only avenue of escape."
The cases studied in New Jersey and Boston cover as wide a
range as the examples given. But for the purposes of this essay
a selection of topics has been made from among those relating
to the constitution and administration of the Bankruptcy Act
itself. The topics selected relate entirely to § 14 of the Act gov-
erning the granting and refusing of a discharge. That section
provides: 0
"b. The judge shall hear the application for a discharge and such
proofs and pleas as may be made in opposition thereto by the trustee or
other parties in interest, at such time as will give the trustee or parties
in interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard; and investigate
the merits of the application and discharge the applicant unless he has (1)
committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or
(2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep books of
account, or records, from which his financial condition and business tran-
sactions might be ascertained; unless the court deem such failure or acts
to have been justified under all the circumstances of the case; or (3) ob-
tained money or property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal
of credit, by making or publishing, or causing to be made or published,
in any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement in writing re-
specting his financial condition; or (4) at any time subsequent to the firsb
day of the twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the petition,
transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed,
destroyed, or concealed, any of his property, with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud his creditors; or (5) has been granted a discharge In bank-
ruptcy within six years; or (6) in the course of proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, refused to obey any lawful order of or to answer any material
question approved by the court; or (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily
any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities: Pro-
vided, That if, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge, the ob-
jector shall show to the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts
which, under this paragraph (b), would prevent his discharge in bank-
ruptcy, then the burden of proving that he has not committed any of such
acts shall be upon the bankrupt; And provided further, That trtstee
shall not interpose objections to a bankrupt's discharge until he shall be
authorized so to do by the creditors at a meeting of creditors called for
that purpose on the application of any creditor."
As evident from the reading of the statute a discharge can be
claimed as a matter of right unless there appears one or more
of the facts specified as grounds for refusing a discharge. The
court has one of two alternatives-to grant or to refuse.
Exemplary of an administrative flexibility, lacking in our
7 See for example Nugent, Consumer Credit and Social Agencies (1931)
42 U. S. INVESTOR 1890; Douglas and Marshall, Santo Aspects of Bank-
ruptcy Administration (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 1.
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system, are the following discharge provisions of the Banlruptcy
Act of England:
"(2) On the hearing of the application the Court shall take into con-
sieration a report 6f the 0. R. as to the bankrupt's conduct and affairs
(including a report as to the bankrupt's conduct during the proceedings
under his bankruptcy), and may either grant or refuse an absolute order
of discharge, or suspend the operation of the order for a specified time,
or grant an order of discharge subject to any conditions with respect to
any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the bank-
rupt, or -with respect to his after-acquired property: Provided that . . .
where in any case any of the facts hereinafter mentioned are proved, the
court shall either
'! (i) refuse the discharge; or
"(ii) suspend the discharge for such period as the court thinks proper;
or
"(iii) suspend the discharge until a dividend of not less than ten shil-
lings in the pound has been paid to the creditors; or
"(iv) require the bankrupt as a condition of his discharge to con-ent to
judgment being entered against him by the 0. R. or trustee for any balance
or part of any balance of the debts provable under the bankruptcy which
is not satisfied at the date of the discharge, such balance or part of any
balance of the debts to be paid out of the future earningror after-acquired
property of the bankrupt in such manner and subject to such conditions as
the Court may direct; but execution shall not be issued on the judgment
without leave of the Court, which leave may be given on proof that the
bankrupt has since his discharge acquired property or income available
towards payment of his debts:
"Provided that, if at any time after the ex\piration of two years from
the date of any order made under this section the bankrupt satisfies the
Court that there is no reasonable probability of his being in a position to
comply with the terms of such order, the Court may modify the terms
of the order, or of any substituted order, in such manner and upon such
conditions as it may think fit.
"(3) The facts herein-before referred to are-
"(a) That the bankrupt's assets are not of a value equal to ten shillings
in the pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities, unless he satisfies
the Court that the fact that the assets are not of a value equal to ten
shillings in the pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities has arisen
from circumstances for -which he cannot justly be held responsible:
"(b) That the bankrupt has omitted to keep such books of account as
are usual and proper in the business carried on by him and as sufficiently
disclose his business transactions and financial position within the three
years immediately preceding his bankruptcy:
"(c) That the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing himself
to be insolvent:
"(d) That the bankrupt has contracted any debt provable in the bank-
ruptcy without having at the time of contracting it any reasonable or
probable ground of expectation (proof whereof shall lie on him) of being
able to pay it:
"(e) That the bankrupt has failed to account satisfactorily for any
loss of assets or for any deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities:
"(f) That the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, his bank-
ruptcy by rash and hazardous speculations, or by unjustifiable extravagance
in living, or by gambling, or by culpable neglect of his business affairs:
"(g) That the bankrupt has put any of his creditors to unneeesary
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expense by a frivolous or vexatious defence to any action properly brought
against him:
"i) That the bankrupt has, within three months preceding the date of
the receiving order, when unable to pay his debts as they become duo, given
an undue preference to any of his creditors:
"(j) That the bankrupt has, within three months preceding the date
of the receiving order, incurred liabilities with a view of making his assets
equal to ten shillings in the pound on the amount of his unsecured lia-
bilities:
"(k) That the bankrupt has, on any previous occasion, been adjudged
bankrupt, or made a composition or arrangement with his creditors:
"(1) That the bankrupt has been guilty of any fraud or fraudulent
breach of trust.
"(6) For the purposes of this section, the report of the official receiver
shall be prima facie evidence of the statements therein contained.
"(8) The powers of suspending and attaching conditions to a bankrupt's
discharge may be exercised concurrently." 8
Somewhat indicative of the actual operation of the English
Act are the foflowing data from the annual reports of the Board
of Trade for the years 1924-1929. During that period 5520 dis-
charges were disposed of finally. The dispositions were:
Granted Refused Conditional Suspended
140 (2.7%) 157 (2.8%) 1268 (22.9%) 3955 (71.0v)
Specifications of the conditions imposed in the 1268 cases are
not available. As to the 3955 cases where discharge was sus-
pended the following treatment of the 809 suspended cases for
1929 is representative:
1 day 18
over 1 day, under 1 me. 61
1 me. & over, under 1 yr. 428
1 yr. & over, under 2 yr. 156
2 yrs. & over, under 3 yr. 91
3 yrs. & over, 55
809
As stated above, data showing the disposition of cases under the
discharge section of our act are not available from the attorney-
general's reports. But in a preliminary announcement of the
recent study by the Department of Justice the following facts
appear: 9
84 & 5 GEo. V. c. 59, § 26 (1914) as amended by 16 & 17 GEO. V, C. '
§ 1 (1926). For similar provisions see the Canadian Bankruptcy Act,
1 REv. STAT. c. 11, §§ 141-145 (1927).
9 See Thacher, Proposed Change in Bankruptcy Act (1931) 3 X. Y.
STATE BAR Ass. BuLL. 532, 537.
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In cases filed between September 1, 1926, and March 1, 1929,
85,252 bankrupts were granted a discharge, and '776 were de-
nied a discharge. In the cases closed during the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1930 approximately 37,277 bankrupts (non-corporate)
were granted a discharge and approdmately 319 (non-corpo-
rate) were denied one. About 98% of the mercantile bankrupts
who asked for a discharge were granted it. In case of non-
mercantile bankrupts 991% received the discharge. In wage-
earner cases only .004% were denied the discharge.
The criticism frequently has been made that discharges are
granted all too freely.' Defects in the present statute have been
made apparent. The opposition to a discharge is a matter of
private initiative of the creditors and their lethargy is notorious.
If there is no opposition the court has no discretion but to grant
the discharge; Certainly it seems clear that additional super-
vision over the dispensing of discharges is needed. Granted,
however, that adequate surveillance is furnished and machinery
for the control provided, two additional major questions are sug-
gested.
(1) Should further specification of grounds for discharge
be made in § 14? (2) Should greater flexibility be given to the
administration of § 14 by providing in addition for conditional
and suspeifded discharges?
The data obtained from the 1500 New Jersey and Boston cases
may or may not be representative of conditions existing through-
out the country. But at least they can serve the function of
furnishing a method of attack or approach to the two questions
of policy just stated. There follows (1) a description of data
relevant to a consideration of those problems; and (2) an inter-
pretation of their import or significance in light of the substan-
tive and administrative features of § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Accounting Records
The importance to business management of adequate accounting
records cannot be denied. The use of an adequate accounting
system not only provides the manager with an accurate survey
of the past but enables him to evaluate the influence of various
factors upon the future course of the business. With this source
of data he can undertake to eliminate or minimize unfavorable
factors and encourage or foster favorable ones. This use is most
sharply outlined in the control of expenses. In ease of an un-
profitable or nearly unprofitable business it is the vital one.n It
o Ibid. For an incisive treatment of the problem, see Radin, Discharge
in Bankruptcy (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. REv. 39.
1The ultimate aim of an accounting system is well expressed by Scott,
in Unity in Accounting Theory (June, 1931) ACCOUNTING REVW 100, 107:
".. .it is the fundamental function of accounts and statistics to so
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is obvious that the presence of even the best of accounting
systems does not assure either its proper use or the sticcess of
the business. On the other hand, the presence of an adequate
one may be assumed to be an earmartk of progressive and effi-
cient management. Conversely, the presence of an inadequate
system or the absence of any system (while perhaps not being
an unmistakable earmark of failure) would seem to be indicative
of the absence of a management necessary to ensure success.
Adequate accounting records are likewise of great importance
to bankruptcy administration. Without them fraudulent prac-
tices become even more difficult to detect; the opportunities for
successfully concealing and diverting assets increase.
The following tables cover all of the cases studied in New
Jersey and Boston except wage earners and non-commercial
bankrupts whb might not be expected to keep books. 12
TABLE I-ACCOUNTING RECORDS
New Jersey
No. of Ade- Inade- Insufficut
Business Cases quate quate None Data
Retailers ........... 231 27.4% 36.9% 24.7% 11%
Proprietors ......... 33 27.2 12.6 30.1 30.1
(Miscellaneous)
Realtors ........... 29 17.3 27.4 38.0 17.3
Wholesalers ........ 12 75 0 0 25
Maniffacturers 26 61.5 26.9 0 11.6
Contractors ......... 99 19.2 39.4 29.4 12
Professional People.. 16 0 12.5 87.5 0
Total .............. 446 27.2 30.9 28.8 13.1
Boston
Retailers ........... 179 17% 47% 33% 3V
Proprietors ......... 32 25 32 34 9
(Miscellaneous)
Realtors ........... 33 15 15 51 19
Wholesalers ........ 34 38 40 19 3
Manufacturers ..... 34 50 26 21 3
Contractors ......... 103 18 29 48 5
Professional People.. 7 29 28 43 0
Total .............. 422 22 37 36 5
analyze and present the facts that the decisions of the management will
be automatic." Only the most appropriate of systems will do this.
12The classifications of "adequate" and "inadequate" obviously are diffi-
cult of precise, objective determination. The needs of the particular busi-
ness were considered and in light of all direct and collateral evidence the
appraisal was made.
The writer is indebted to Mr. William W. Werntz of the accounting de-




Adequate Inadequate None cient Data
No. of No. of No. of No. of
Cases % Cases % Cases % Cascs %
New Jersey.. 121 27.2 138 30.9 128 28.8 59 13.1
Boston ...... 95 22 154 37 153 36 20 5
Combined ... 216 24.8 292 33.5 281 32.4 79 9.3
Out of a total of 868 bankrupts-all of whom, according to
accepted standards of prudent management, should have kept
books-only 24.87 kept adequate systems.23  Almost a third
(32.4%) kept no accounting records whatsoever. As seen from
the above tables the wholesalers and manufacturers rated high-
est but even they fell far short of accepted standards for modern
enterprise.
The Boston and New Jersey cases were very much alike in
this regard-though in Boston a distinctly metropolitan mer-
cantile group was studied, while in New Jersey the cases came
from all over the state, from small as well as large, from rural
as well as urban centers. Statistics for other districts are not
available. If those conditions are representative, we are witness-
ing in this country an avalanche of failing businesses which
their owners were presumably never in a position to understand
or to control intelligently and which come into bankuptcy with
but few aids to those whose task it is to collect assets.
It is very questionable if this species of uncontrolled enter-
prise should be allowed. The activities of commercial houses,
of agencies of the government and of educational institutions, as
well as the increasing professionalization of accountants, have
not only made knowledge of accounting practice (and theory)
easily available but have resulted in the preparation of simple
and practical systems of accounting. But the educational pro-
gram of these various agencies has far to go. Though the situ-
ation is an ideal one for creditor control, too many of them are
competing for business. As a result the type of supervision and
regulation that they might furnish tends to be absent.
13 It should be noted that the percentages in these tables are based on
total cases rather than merely cases where adequate data were at hand.
To have followed the latter procedure would have involved an assumption
that the cases of "insufficient data" were distributed in the same propor-
tions in the categories relating to books as the cases where there was
sufficient data. Such an assumption is obviously not true: insufficient data
is much more likely to occur in cases of low-grade bookkeeping than of
careful, adequate bookkeeping. The comparison of the Boston and New
Jersey cases confirms this point. In the Boston cases data were lacldng
on only 5% as against 13% of the New Jersey cases, yet the "adequate
books" were actually proportionately less in known cases in Boston than




Meanwhile the only regulatory provision is contained in § 14
of the Bankruptcy Act, set forth above, providing that the court
shall grant a discharge unless the bankrupt has "failed to keep
books of account, or records, from which his financial condition
and business transactions might be ascertained; unless the court
deem such failure or acts to have been justified under all the cir-
cumstances of the case." 14 As pointed out above the lethargy
of creditors in opposing a discharge is notorious. As a result
extremely few discharges are denied. How many are actually
denied because of the failure to keep books is not known. But if
the cases of fraud were eliminated the number would probably
be infinitesimal. In a study made of 1004 bankruptcy cases
closed in New Jersey during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1929,
no discharge was refused for failure to keep books.1"
In this connection the English provision set forth above is of
interest. One of the instances when the court has the discretion
to refuse, suspend, or grant, conditionally or unconditionally,
the discharge is in case the bankrupt "has omitted to keep such
books of account as are usual and proper in the business carried
on by him and as sufficiently disclose his business transactions
and financial position within the three years immediately pre-
ceding his bankruptcy." The English Act also imposes a crim-
inal penalty for failure to keep proper books of account.10
14 For cases interpreting this provision see Nix v. Sternberg, 38 F. (2d)
611 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); In re Neiderheiser, 45 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930); In re Weisberger, 41 F. (2d) 275 (M. D. Pa. 1930); Southern
Rock Island Plow Co. v. Florence, 29 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
'1 These 1004 cases represented all but 37 cases closed during that flscal
year. They were not the same cases as those being described in this
article. For analysis of these 1004 cases see Douglas and Marshall, op ait.
supra note 7.
16 Section 158 provides:
"(1) Any perion who has been adjudged bankrupt or in respect of
whose estate receiving order has been made shall be guilty of a miede-
meanour, if, having been engaged in any trade or business during any
period in the two years immediately preceding the date of the presenta-
tion of the bankruptcy petition, he has not kept proper books of account
throughout that period and throughout any further period, in which lie
was so engaged between the date of the presentation of the petition and
the date of the receiving order, or has not preserved all books of account
so kept:
"Provided that a person who has not kept or has not preserved such
books of account shall not be convicted of an offence under this section-
"(a) if his unsecured liabilities at the date of the receiving order did
not exceed, in the case of a person who has not on any previous occasion
been adjudged bankrupt or made a composition or arrangement with his
creditors five hundred pounds; or in any other case one hundred pounds; or
"(b) if he proves that in the circumstances in which he traded or car-
ried on business the omission was honest and excusable. * * *
"(3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed not to
have kept proper books of account if he has not kept such books or accounts
[Vol. 41
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Figures for England showing the exact number of bankrupts
who kept books satisfying the requirements of the statute are
not available. But from the years 1924-1929 inclusive, there
were 5685 applications for discharges.1' In 3175 of those ap-
plications (55%) it was reported and not disproved that the
bankrupt had not kept proper books of account. It is not known
how inany discharges were denied, suspended or conditionally
granted on that ground alone. In most of the cases where objec-
tion was made on that ground other grounds were also present.
But as noted above, during those six years, of the 5520 discharges
finally disposed of, only 2.7% were granted and 2.8% refused,
22.9% being granted conditionally, and 71.6% being suspended.
So in all probability but few discharges were granted where in-
adequate books were kept.
In this connection the operation of the criminal provision of
the English Act is of interest. During the years 1921-1929 in-
clusive there were 246 convictions for bankruptcy offenses. Of
these 55 or 22% were for failure to keep proper books. These
data from England indicate how seriously both in theory and in
practice the failure to keep proper accounts is considered.
If the Bankruptcy Act of this country was amended so as to
provide for greater supervision of the discharge and to cease
depending solely on the initiative of paralyzed creditors, doubt-
less great improvement would follow.
But even so, it would seem better to strengthen the provision
along the lines of the English statute and vest in those who are
dispensing discharges discretion to grant, conditionally or un-
conditionally, suspend or deny them in case such proper books
of account are not kept. This would abolish the necessity of
grouping all cases categorically into two classes and of denying
as are necessary to exhibit or explain his transactions and financial posi-
tion in his trade or business, including a book or books containing entries
from day to day in sufficient detail of all cash received and cash paid,
and, where the trade or business has involved dealings in goods, statcments
of annual stocktakings, and (except in the case of goods zold by way of
retail trade to the actual consumer) accounts of all goods sold and pur-
chased showing the buyers and sellers thereof in sufficient detail to enable
the goods and the buyers and sellers thereof to be identified."
This indicates the seriousness with which the problem of the uncon-
trolled enterprise is considered in England. Such drastic penalty probably
goes further than opinion in this country is prepared to go. It provides
an interesting contrast between the philosophies in the two countries. The
Canadian Act is very similar to the English. See REv. STAT. c. 11, § 193
(1927). For recent summaries of the English, Italian, Belgian, German,
Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Dutch, Mexican, Swiss, Cuban, and Japanese
bankruptcy laws, see 5 Joum oF NAT. Ass. OF REFEREES IN B,%xiKRuPIcY
(1931) 82 et. seq.
- The data set forth are compiled from the annual reports of the Board
of Trade for the years 1924-1929 inc.
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discharges to one and granting them to the other. Consequently,
all degrees of culpability would be recognized, the in-between
cases would be provided for, and finer adjustments to the re-
quirements of individual cases could be made. Such provisions
theoretically would supply an effective deterrent to unbusiness-
like practices presently prevailing. Income tax laws have gone
a long way towards forcing business men to order their affairs
more efficiently. The Bankruptcy Act might be made to per-
form a similar function.
The theory of freedom of opportunity which has prevailed in
this country has resulted in a minimum of governmental inter-
ference in strictly private enterprise. Denial of discharges in
bankruptcy has been guarded zealously in the interest of hard-
pressed debtors who desire a new lease on life. The fact that
this is a country with large natural resources has led to the
notion that failures can be afforded; that experimentation in
enterprise should be encouraged; that out of the failures may
come successes which will result in the promotion and develop-
ment of our industrial and economic potentialities. That the
annual bill which consumers pay for such experimentation is
large is not denied. But it is insisted that it is worth the price.
The proposed change in the Bankruptcy Act would offer but
slight interference with that experimentation. It would, how-
ever, discriminate between controlled and uncontrolled experi-
mentation. The conditions imposed would be slight and for the
most part easily-met. The insistence on a minimum of efficient
management would tend to bring to industry more knowledge,
foresight and intelligent planning. In addition it would serve as
a preventive of many fraudulent practices difficult to detect if
no records are kept. It seems clear that the difference between
such controlled and uncontrolled enterprise is one measure of
the difference between legitimate and illegitimate experiments.
Automobile Accident Judgments
There were a large number 'and variety of tort claims listed
among the liabilities in both the New Jersey and Boston cases.
There was one $45,000 judgment for alienation of affections; one
of $18,000 for violation of a copyright; one of $3,000 for gun
shot; several against landlords for negligence; a number for
conversion; and two for dog bites. One business man failed
owing $1023 and having assets of $50. The entire amount of
his liabilities was made up of a judgment for an assault and
battery. It appeared that this sole creditor was a competitor
who engaged the bankrupt in a heated argument ending in a fist
fight.
By far the greater number of tort claims, however, resulted
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from automobile accidents. Among the New Jersey bankrupts
over 4% (29 out of 598) had among their liabilities automobile
accident judgments. The amounts varied from $60 to $25,000.
The average judgment was $5,230. Ten were for $5,000 or over.
In fifteen of the cases the judgment was over 75,. of all the
liabilities. In ten of the cases it was approximately the entire
amount of the liabilities. The total amount of all such judg-
ments was $151,000; the total liabilities, $1,810,148; the total
assets $23,845. In twelve of the twenty-nine cases there were
no assets or assets below $100. The amount of the judgments in
those cases totaled $53,446 or 35% of the total amount of acci-
dent judgments for the entire group of 29. Thus in many of the
cases the tort claimant received nothing and at best only nominal
dividends.
The 29 cases were made up of five contractors, two retailers,
two professional people and twenty laborers, clerks, and sales-
men. In all of the instances where the judgment was over 75%
of the liabilities the bankrupt was a laborer, clerk, or salesman.
January 1, 1927, was the effective date of the Massachusetts
compulsory automobile liability insurance law. Under that law
it is necessary to carry a $5,000-$10,000 policy or bond covering
"bodily injuries." Is Hence it might be expected that there
would be fewer of such claims among the Boston group. Of the
910 Boston cases 26 (2.5%) included among their liabilities such
accident judgments. The total amount of all such judgments was
$33,645; the total liabilities $211,828; and the total assets $15,-
178. The average judgment was $1,217. The range was from
$27 to $12,290. In 21 of the 26 cases there were no assets or
assets under $100. The amount of judgments in those 21 cases
totaled $33,147 or 99% of the total for the entire group of 26.
The 26 cases were comprised of six retailers; six truck and taxi
owners; two contractors; one jobber; two professional people;
and nine laborers, clerks, and salesmen.
These Boston cases fall within three groups. First are those
cases ante-dating the effective date of the compulsory insurance
law, i.e., January 1, 1927. There were nine of those cases with
total accident judgments of $25,170; total liabilities of $90,670
and assets of $636. The amount of accident judgments in this
group was 75% of the judgments in the entire 26 cases. The
judgments in this group ranged from $27 to $12,900. The
average amount was $2,796. There were two $5,000 or over.
Most of them were for personal rather than property injury.
The nine cases were composed of two laborers and clerks; one
contractor; two professional people; three retailers; and one taxi
owner.
18 MASS. CTi. STAT. C. 90, §§ 34A et scq. (1927).
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Second are those cases representing judgments for injuries
against which compulsory coverage is not provided by statute.
These are property injuries, the statute only requiring coverage
against "bodily injuries." Sixteen of the cases fell in this
group. The total of all such judgments was $3,475; the total li-
abilities, $116,158; the total assets $14,542. The average judg-
ment was $217. 'The range was from $41 to $428. In none of
them was the judgment even 50% of the liabilities. In most of
them it was a negligible factor in the bankruptcy.
In the third group, where the debtor's liability for the accident
exceeded the amount of his insurance coverage, there was only
one case. The excess claim was $5,000, comprising practically
all of the liabilities; and the assets were zero.
There were a half dozen cases where the judgment had been
paid before bankruptcy at great financial sacrifice. In fact in
each of those cases the payment of the judgment, costs and at-
torney's fees was a major contributing cause to bankruptcy.
Those payments ranged from $126 (a laborer) to $6,000 (a
manufacturer). Needless to say those claims were not covered
by insurance.
These data not only are interesting in a study of the incidence
of the Massachusetts compulsory insurance law. They also give
some notion of one of the functions which bankruptcy is per-
forming. In 1898, when the present Act was adopted, the auto-
mobile was in its infancy. Today it has risen to a place of
major economic and social significance in modern society. It has
been the subject of extensive administrative and legislative con-
trol. Yet it persists in its annual toll of life, limb and property.
The discharge section of the Act drawn in light of economic
and social conditions existing at the close of last century is
serving a function which could not be visualized at that time.
Industrial accidents and the normal run of torts were common
then. But the advent of the automobile gave rise to problems
sui generis. In the first place, aided and abetted by high pres-
sure salesmanship and instalment buying, the impecunious
owner and operator appeared. In the second place, the wide-
spread use and the increasing speed of the machines multiplied
many times, to all members of society, the risks of transporta-
tion. Furthermore at the passage of the act liability insurance
was in its infancy.19 Not until this century was it sufficiently
standardized and advertised so as to be available to buyers' gen-
erally.
Statistics for other districts showing the extent to which bank-
ruptcy is employed to get rid of such claims are not available.
If these data are representative they challenge attention. It may
19 See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Adminidtration of Risk (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 584, 591.
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be that one of the advantages of a broad and general discharge
provision is that it furnishes a flexibility which permits a con-
tinual adjustment of the law to changed conditions despite legis-
lative lag. But it does not follow that such flexibility should
be allowed without a continual, new appraisal of the functions
being performed. Little attention since 1898 has been given
to such aspects of bankruptcy. Accident judgments furnish but
one instance of the desirability of reappraisal of functions in
light of new conditions.
The answer is by no means clear. The problem has so many
ramifications that no direct solution can be offered on the basis
of these data without consideration of the many other factors
involved. The efforts towards socializing such losses by requir-
ing insurance have to date not resulted in much legislative
support, though progress has been made.- To wait for the
states to act will apparently take considerable time. On the
other hand, to deprive suddenly all owners and operators of
cars the benefit of the discharge section for all accident claims
might be a great hardship. Frequently such accidents result
in large judgments impossible to pay. Bankruptcy is the only
way out. However, it might well be argued that all owners and
operators should be held to the standard of prudent manage-
ment and not be discharged from such judgments as would be
covered by, say, a standard $5,000-$10,000 liability policy. It
seems reasonable to insist that the cost of such coverage be
-treated as a part of operating costs. Such indirect method
would doubtless speed up the socialization of th~ose losses. Acci-
dent victims would become less of a social problem.
Speczd..tion and Gambling
In about 5% of the New Jersey cases (29 out of 600) and 6%
of the Boston cases (51 out of 910) the elements of specula-
tion and gambling were present. Included in this group are
only those cases where the gambling or speculation was un-
connected with and not an ordinary incident of the particular
business, trade or vocation in which the banlrupt was engaged.
Excluded are real estate operators or speculative builders or
contractors and the like whose promotional activities may have
an inherent element of speculation.
The New Jersey cases were distributed as follows: wage earn-
ers, 7; retailers, 13; manufacturers, 1; wholesalers, 2; profes-
sional, 3; real estate, 2; and contractors, 1. The total assets in
these cases-were $909,824 and the total liabilities $1,532,010.
20 See, for example, Conn. Public Acts 1927, c. 161; 1929, c. 300; Bovwrs,
COMPULSORY AuTomoBmE INSURANCE (1929); Marx, Compulsory Compcn-
sation Tzhurance (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 164; Ballantine, A Stu'dy of Com-
pensation for Autonobile Accddents, 16 A. B. A. J. 97 (1930).
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The Boston cases were composed of-wage earners, 22; re-
tailers, 9; wholesalers and importers, 9; professional, 2; real
estate, 4; contractors, 3; brokers, 1; and taxi-owner, 1. The
total assets in these cases were $349,140 and the total liabilities
$1,777,757.
In not every case did speculation or gambling alone bring
about insolvency. Frequently there were contributing causes
of many kinds. But in all the cases of this group it was appar-
ent that the losses suffered in these ways were major and
material contributors to insolvency. In the case of the marginal
business they meant the difference between continued operation
and liquidation. At times they resulted in wiping out the re-
serve of a successful business with resultant difficulties on the
downward turn of the business cycle. Some cases were pathetic
and sad-a life time of frugality and hard work followed by
an orgy of speculative craze. But most were hardly to be con-
doned. Many were aftermaths of the stock market crash in the
fall of 1929. And there were a few hangovers from the Florida
land boom of six or seven years ago. Short sketches of a few
of the most typical cases are set forth below.
No. 0696 was a laborer earning $35 a week. His wife received $15 a
week for stenographic services. They purchased a home for $5,700 the
carrying charges being about $75 a month. They secured access to a
source of market "tips." They too were wiped out on the stock markot
crash, losing about $5,000. They struggled along for a while. On a Satur-
day they appeared at a retail house and purchased $75 of goods on credit.
On Monday next the petition was filed. In spite of the heavy losses and
low income the debts exceeded the liabilities by less than $2,000, most of
which was owed commercial houses.
Case No. 0866 was the bankruptcy of a wholesale and retail food supply
house owing $14,000 with no assets. Most of the debts were owed to fif-
teen wholesalers, jobbers and manufacturers. The business was seven
years old, well established and profitable. The owner became deeply en-
gaged in illegal liquor traffic. The apparently bona fide enterprise was
used as a cover for those activities. Soon he was suspected and the losses
from raids were heavy. He was prosecuted and convicted and sentenced
to jail. The legal expenses were $25,000, which, combined with unfavor-
able publicity, loss of time and neglect of the business, sounded the end of
the supply house. The sales dropped from about $100,000 to $500 a year.
The claims of the creditors arose for the most part prior to the inception
of the illegal enterprise.
Case No. 702 Was the bankruptcy of a $30 a week salesman whose lia-
bilities were over $2,000 and whose assets were zero. His salary averaged
about $2,000 a year. He lost $1,200 on the stock market. There were
other losses at poker and craps. Much was spent on parties. $3,500 was
spent on a particular lady. Much money was obtained from relatives some
of whom were listed as creditors. However, $1,000 was owed to retailers
and other regular and strictly bona fide, commercial creditors.
No. 0699 was the second bankruptcy of this doctor. Discharged four
years ago from his debts, he appeared again with $66,000 owed and $25
of assets with which to pay them. His second bankruptcy, as well as his
first, was precipitated by real estate speculation. Convinced after his first
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failure that he could succeed better or as well at construction as at his
profession he began his operations anew in the same neighborhood. His
second venture was as unsuccessful as his first. His liabilities this time
were swelled by a $45,000 judgment for alienation of affections. But he
affirmed that that claim was not pressing and not a cause of his voluntary
petition.
Wholesaler No. 0663 had liabilities of $46,000 and assets of about $42,-
000. He was successful as a wholesaler but not adept with second mort-
gages. Speculation in these lost him $18,000 in two years and over $50,000
in the previous five years. Russian and German bonds added another
$5,000. His wholesale business debts were not much over $20,000. From
one concern, however, he purchased during the six weeks preceding bank-
"ruptcy $1,300 of merchandise on credit-almost as much as he had pur-
chased from them during the entire previous year.
There was evidence in case No. 0570 that this importer once had a very
successful business but had withdrawn from it for living expenses amounts
far in excess of profits. To recoup and to restore to the business the funds
thus withdrawn he began to speculate in the stock markLt and in comnoli-
ties not in his line of business. His losses were very large. Some from
whom he borrowed to speculate were not aware that the advances were to
be employed outside of his importing business. He failed with $146,000
liabilities and assets of $33,000.
No. 0560 was the ease of a wholesaler who over a period of eight years
had annual sales averaging between $30,000 and $40,000. The business
was sound and prosperous. Soon he began developing side activities.
Among these were promotions of boxing matches and pictures. Some were
successful and the easy money went fast. The business continued to be
good but the losses on promotions grew large. There were some expensive
difficulties with town authorities. About $10,000 was lost. The game of
poker likewise took its toll. The legitimate business creditors began to
press and threaten attachment. So the petition was filed. There were no
assets and claims of about $1,700. Most of this amount was owed to
creditors of the wholesale business.
No. 0296 was the case of a $25 a week salesman, with liabilities of about
$6,000 and no assets. Up to three years ago he made $60 a week and lived
comfortably. Members of his family became sick and the cost of medical
care amounted to several thousand dollars. In view of his decreased salary
he probably was insolvent several years ago. Nevertheless (or perhaps in
view of the fact) he started playing cards professionally, financing it by
borrowing. His losses were about $4,000 in that short period. His petition
was filed to avoid attachment of wages by impatient retailers and lenders.
Case No. 0290 was another salesman earning $40 a week. He failed
for about $27,000 and had no assets with which to pay. His trouble dated
back to 1925 when he put $11,000 into Florida real estate and contracted
to pay $27,000 more. He lost his $11 000 and struggled to pay off the
balance. Interest ran high and little progress was made. No other debts
were owed except on this contract.
No. 0255 was a laundress making $33 a week. She had accumulated
over a period of years $5,000 in savings. This was used in the fall of
1928 to purchase two well known stocks on margin. In the stock marl:et
crash the stocks dropped about forty points each, wiping her out and leav-
ing a balance of $600 due the- broker. Suit was brought for that sum.
That claim represented all of her liabilities. Her assets were zero.
No. 0180 was the ease of a retailer with assets of $3,000 and liabilities
of $11,000. He had been in business a year and a half. His business was
moderately successful though he was inexperienced in the business and
kept no books. He used the assets of the business to purchase horse race
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lottery tickets. In the year and a half he lost over $12,000 in cash by
such method. His losses were at times as high as $300 a week. Prac-
tically all of his debts were owed to wholesalers, jobbers and manufacturers.
Under the English Act it seems likely that but few of these
bankrupts would have been granted an unconditional discharge.
Under that Act the court shall either refuse, grant or suspend
the discharge or grant it conditionally if it appears "that the
bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, his bankruptcy by
rash and hazardous speculations, or by unjustifiible extrav-
agance in living, or by gambling, or by culpable neglect of his
business." Furthermore he may be prosecuted for a misde-
meanor if, "having been engaged in any trade or business, and
having outstanding... any debts contracted in the course and
for the purposes of such trade or business, he has, within two
years prior to the presentation of the bankruptcy petition,
materially contributed to or increased the extent of his insol-
vency by gambling, or by rash and hazardous speculations, and
such gambling or speculations are unconnected with his trade
or business." It is further provided that in determining whether
any speculations were "rash and hazardous" the "financial posi-
tion of the accused person at the time when he entered into the
speculations" should be taken into consideration.21
Of the 5,685 cases dealt with under the English discharge
section during the years 1924-1929 inclusive, in 1201 (21%) it
was reported and not disproved that there were speculation,
gambling, extravagance in living, or culpable neglect of the busi-
ness. 22 How many of these cases involved speculation and
gambling alone does nbt appear. Of those 5,685 cases 5,520
were finally disposed of under the discharge section, and as noted
above, only 2.7% were granted a discharge. Thus it is probable
that discharges in England are being refused, suspended or con-
ditionally granted in a large number of cases involving the ele-
ments of speculation and gambling.
The operation of the penal provision noted above is likewise
of interest. There were 246 convictions for violations of the
Bankruptcy Act in the years 1924-1929 inclusive. 39 or 16%
of the convictions were for gambling or speculation. Most of
the sentences were imprisonment for short terms.
There are no such provisions, "either civil or criminal, in the
Bankruptcy Act of this country. Unless other elements were
involved, such as concealment of assets, fraudulent conveyances,
etc., the discharge could be claimed as a matter of right. There
are no statistics available other than the above indicating the
21 § 157.
22 These data are compiled from the annual reports of the Board of Trade
for the years 1924-1929 inc.
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prevalence of speculation and gambling in this country among
bankrupts. But if the statistics given for New Jersey and Boston
are at all representative the problem is of major importance.
A strong case could be made out for refusing an absolute grant
of a discharge in such cases, particularly as regards insolvent
businesses. It seems unfair to permit a business man to divert
his personal or business assets, on which creditors have relied,
to other speculative enterprises or to employ them in gambling.
To make the creditors take such risks in addition to the normal
business risks of which they were aware is to alter radically
the conditions surrounding the extension of credit. It is one
thing if a creditor of a wholesaler agrees to take his chance of
payment on the outcome of a game of craps. It is quite another
to force him to take that chance when the credit was extended
on the basis of the normal business risks of that particular
wholesale house. To allow such entrepreneurs to enlarge so
freely their creditors' risks and then to proceed blithely to bank-
ruptcy for the aid and succor of the state seems inequitable.
But tha- they are doing it is clear. That that is one of the func-
tions being performed in this country by bankruptcy calls for
a reappraisal of the entire system.
That all of the Boston and New Jersey cases involving specula-
tion and gambling should be denied or discharged would be diffi-
cult to support. The facts of particular bankruptcies often give
to the cases a turn which suggests ameliorating circumstances.
An attempt to treat all cases of speculation and gambling cate-
gorically would be absurd. It would seem desirable, however,
to provide administrators with discretionary power so as to take
cognizance of the variants among the cases. Provisions for con-
ditional or suspended discharge are peculiarly adapted to such
use and would supply the necessary administrative flexibility.
Whether such devices would act as deterrents to such unde-
sirable and unethical practices can hardly be guessed. The large
number of English cases involving such factors may raise doubts.
However, regardless of such preventive aspects the protection
afforded the creditor class would be more than nominal. Whether
it should be made a crime to have suffered bankruptcy due to
rash and hazardous speculation and gambling may seem more
doubtful. Orgies of speculation may be too popular to warrant
legislative interference of that kind.
Contracting Debts Without Reasoiwble Expcctation
of Ability to Pay-Extravaga c
As noted previously, the English Act provides for a denial, sus-
pension, conditional or unconditional grant of a discharge not
only in case there has been "unjustifiable extravagance in liv-
ing" but also in case the bankrupt "has contracted any debt
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provable in bankruptcy without at the time of contracting it any
reasonable or probable ground of expectation (proof whereof
shall lie on him) of being able to pay it."
No facts are available showing the number of cases in England
in which "unjustifiable extravagance in living" appears. Such
cases are lumped with speculation and gambling as noted above.
But the following data 23 throw some light on the provision
penalizing incurrence of debts without "reasonable or probable"
expectation of being able to pay. Of the 5,685 applications for
discharge in the years 1924-1929 inclusive there were 1,002 cases,
where that fact was reported and not disproved. In other words
in 17.6% of the cases for that period discharges were dispensed
or vithheld in light of that fact.
What the facts of these 1,002 cases were does not appear.
If they were anything like the New Jersey and Boston cases,
great difficulty would be experienced in classifying cases under
this head.
Looking back on some bankruptcies it would be difficult to
determine if at the time most of the claims were incurred the
debtor was extravagant or without reasonable grounds of ex-
pectation of being able to pay. A subsequent event-illness,
medical cost, a divorce, partial unemployment, reduction in
salary, increase in cost of living, etc.-frequently occurs and
changes -and distorts the whole picture. To trace the influence
of each factor and to appraise it in relation to the total situation
would be almost impossible. Likewise to attribute extravagance
in living retrospectively to bankrupts without considering and
evaluating a myriad of intervening factors would be unfair.
Eliminating the marginal or doubtful cases there were, of
course, many instances of gross and apparently unjustifiable
indulgence in credit, in radios, automobiles, fur coats, furniture,
etc.-about as many as there were of speculation and gambling
Some of these instances bordered on fraud. Others represented
excessive optimism. Some were cases of moronic intelligence
and illiteracy. Others bordered on speculation. A few striking
examples chosen from among consumer bankrupts follow.
Laborer No. 0258 was hopelessly ignorant and practically illiterate. He
had regular employment at $18 a week. His wife worked occasionally but
her financial aid was negligible. An aged relative was totally dependent
on him. His annual insurance premiums were $170 (automobile, life and
accident). In 1925 he purchased a house for $4,500 agreeing to pay $50
.a month. These payments were made irregularly for five years for the
most part from rentals. Then he was induced to exchange it for another
house costing $13,000. His equity in the first house was appraised at
$1,000 and he was credited with that. The balance was covered by two
-mortgages. The bankrupt took only the oral promise of the purchaser to




of the purchaser the bank foreclosed, sold the property for $1,000 and re-
covered against the bankrupt on the deficiency. Meanwhile the payments
on the second house proved onerous and the taxes were in arrears to about
$300. Added to that was the purchase on instalment of several hundred
dollars of furniture and a $400 automobile. His total monthly payments
far exceeded his income.
Salesman No. 0314 had $150 of assets and $1,600 of liabilities. His
salary was between $75 and $50 a week. Half of his obligations were for
high class merchandise purchased by him and presented as gifts to a cer-
tain lady. It seems that a good part of his salary had been thus diverted
for a number of years. The extravagance in living here bordered on fraud.
No. 0572 also was a case of extravagance bordering on fraud. This
good looking young lady was on a salary of $35 per week. Her liabilities
were $2,200 and her assets $15. Practically all her debts were owed to
retailers for clothes, shoes and other articles of ladies' wear. These re-
tailers were among the best shops in Boston. When the debts were in-
curred there seemed to be little chance that they could be paid. She was
very particular to buy a coat of the best quality shortly before the peti-
tion was filed. The direct cause of the filing of the petition was said to
be an escape from the attachment of wages by creditors tired of waiting.
No. 0046 was a $45. a week salesman who received a discharge in bank-
ruptcy in 1928 while engaged in the same line of business. On receiving
his discharge he purchased quite unjustifiably a ear for $500 on instalment.
Very few of his bills incurred following his other bankruptcy were ever
paid. He owed rent of $800-nearly a year in arrears; retailers, $1,200;
and doctors $200. His wife and two children lived comfortably. His
first bankruptcy had much the same complexion as this one. After his
first bankruptcy he did not readjust his scale of living even in face or
poor business conditions. He was still profitably employed at the time of
this study and making enough to pay current bills and to amortize slowly
his indebtedness.
No. 0880 was very similar to the above case. Here the bankrupt was
an $1,800 a year clerk used to"a $7,500 income of three years ago. His
standard of living remained on the $7,500 level. He blamed the "loose
credit" practices of Boston department stores.
Photographer No. 0143 failed seven years previously and was not granted
his discharge on objection of creditors. He never kept books, knew only
a few items of expense and had no notion of his gross or net profits,
though he was in business for four years. His assets were p200 and his
liabilities $5,000. He bought many articles of furniture and household
appliances-all on conditional sales. At the time of bankruptcy he owed
$1,300 on such purchases. Further he owed $1,100 to retailers and most
of the balance on a house he contracted to buy. This house was the Zec-
ond he had purchased. The first also was lost on foreclosure. He ad-
mitted that both purchases were way beyond his means. This was ob-
viously a case of lavish and extravagant living. There was no direct
evidence of fraud, though it did appear that after his first bankruptcy he
sought and obtained credit from those who never knew him before.
In devising an administrative procedure to handle such cases
of consmners there are additional factors to be considered. The
prevalence of high pressure salesmanship with seductive means
for breaking down sales resistance has not been accompanied
by the correlative technique among buyers of building up sales
resistance. Subtle methods of advertising, the advent of instal-
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ment buying, the growth and development of financial agencies
for financing the consumer, all have made the temptation to
extravagance overwhelming. Further, the competition among
sellers too often has been so notorious that the buyer has been
free to pick and choose. Any proposal to prevent the victim
of such circumstances and subtle influences from escaping from
his dilemma raises serious doubts. To follow the English pro-
vision to its full extent would seem unwise.24
Analogous cases of improvident and extravagant use of credit
from wholesalers, jobbers, manufacturers, etc., frequently ap-
peared among the business groups at the time of entering busi-
ness. The following case (No. 420) is quite typical of many
others.
Five men who had driven laundry wagons for several years decided to go
into the laundry business for themselves, even though the competition
among laundries was very keen and well known, and even though they
had had no experience in business. Each figured that he had a considerable
amount of good will resulting from friendly relations with patrons of his
former employer. Accordingly a corporation was formed, the amount
of paid in capital being $1500, gathered from the savings of the five men.
Thereupon they announced their intention of beginning business. Competi-
tion among the supply houses was so keen that all these prospective en-
trepreneurs needed to do was to wait for the best offer. From one supply
house they finally purchased on conditional sale for $30,000 the necessary
machinery, paying practically nothing down. They kept no books or ac-
24 In this connection certain data concerning 221 Boston bankrupts from
the salaried group are of interest. In the year preceding bankruptcy 5vo
were out of employment completely; 8% *worked, but for less than half
time; 33% were employed for half the time or more (but less than full
time) ; 54% were employed full time. During that year 5% received no
salary; 5% less than $500; 16% between $500 and $999; 23% between
$1000 and $1,499; 24% between $1,500 and $1,999; 19%. from $2,000 to
$2,499; and 8% over $2,500. The average salary was $1,526. The average
liabilities were $3,524; the average assets being $219. In 166 of the 221
cases (75%) there were no assets. In practically every one of the cases
the direct cause of filing the petition was supplementary proceedings.
In 82 of the cases (13%) debts were owed loan and finance companies
(not including commercial banks). The average loan for these 82 eases
was $626. Also in 82 cases debts averaging $420 each were owed for goods
bought on instalment.
Except for the examples given above, there were practically none bor-
dering on fraud. In not over 7% of the 221 cases could it be said that
there was gross and unjustifiable extravagance measured as of the time
of the incurrence of the indebtedness. In the balance of the cases a host
of complicating factors such as sickness of the bankrupt, medical cost,
unemployment, reduced earnings, had intervened, distorting the picture
and forcing the debtor to attempt to amortize his indebtedness over a
longer period of time. For a more detailed discussion of these 221 cases
see Douglas and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 7, in which the suggestion
is made that the Bankruptcy Act be amended so as to give salaried bank-
rupts the option to amortize under the protection and supervision of the
bankruptcy court all or a part of their indebtedness.
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counting records. Competition was so keen that they lasted but a few
months coming into bankruptcy owing almost S30,000 over their assetz.
Immediately on filing the petition the stockholders formed another corpora-
tion and reentered the laundry business, obtaining additional equipment
from other supply houses. The history of the second venture is not lmown.
Space does not permit in this article to go into a detailed
analysis of the capitalization of all the bankrupts at the time
of the commencement of the business.. A few general comments,
however, are in point indicating the extent to which wholesalers,
jobbers, manufacturers, commercial banks, etc., are extending
credit to enable businesses to begin.
The New Jersey cases were particularly striking. The amount
provided by the owner without borrowing was only about 45w.
The balance or 55% was furnished entirely by personal loans
or by credit from supply houses, wholesalers, jobbers, etc. Of
the 278 retailers there were 34 (12.2%) who were entirely
financed by others, no capital of their own being staked on the
venture.
The Boston cases present a striking contrast. In all of those
business firns the amount provided by the owner without bor-
rowing was about 84%. In only 5 out of the 211 retailers (2.3%)
was the capital entirely provided by outsiders. Possible ex-
planations for this contrast in the cases will be explored in sub-
sequent articles. Priv-mw facie the difference cannot be explained
altogether by the fact that the Boston firms were larger, as the
average capitalization of the New Jersey firms was $7,800, of
Boston films $8,500.
If conditions generally are anything like the New Jersey situa-
tion and creditors are making it easy for marginal entrepreneurs
to enter business, it would seem unwise to penalize too severely
the debtor. So long as the barriers against entering business
are down, ill advised and poorly executed undertakings will con-
tinue. So long as the prevalent notion of freedom of opportunity
prevails (in practice as well as in theory) it seems harsh to im-
pose on the foolish (and sometimes unfortunate) severe penal-
ties for their improvidence. If creditors are creating or con-
tributing to the situation, they should not be allowed their pound
of flesh.
To catch the cases tinged with fraud (both in case of con-
sumers and of those in or entering business) some further spec-
ification in the discharge section would be desirable. At present
the only provision is that part of § 14 which permits a denial
of the discharge if money or property has been obtained on
credit "by making or publishing, or causing to be made or pub-
lished, in any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement
in writing respecting his financial condition." But among the
cases studied were also a number of instances (some of which
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have been given above) where consumers, retailers and whole-
salers obtained goods, without written representations, at times
when it seemed extremely doubtful if they could pay or intended
to pay. It is difficult to justify the difference in treatment under
§ 14 of the Bankruptcy Act between a debtor who puts his false
statement in writing and one who by all of his actions and words
is clearly out to defraud his creditors by getting something for
nothing or a lot for little. As supplementary to the present Act
some modified form of the English provision would be desirable.
It is true, of course, that if the English provision were in-
corporated in haec verba into our statute and coupled with a
discretionary power to deny, suspend or grant, conditionally or
unconditionally, the discharge in such cases, no injustice need
be done as cases where the creditors had contributed to the
situation by their laxity, generosity and competition could be
specially handled. On the whole, however, it would seem more
desirable to recognize in the statute basic differences between
cases of mere overindulgence in credit and those where the cir-
cumstances surrounding the overindulgence indicated, prima
facie, a fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor or where
the extravagance was gross and wholly unjustifiable. In such
cases there should be discretion to adjust the penalty to the com-
plexion of the individual case.
Culpable Neglect of Business
This factor alone was clearly discernible in but few cases. It
was usually associated with speculation or gambling, some in-
stances of which have been given above. In the isolated instances
where it did appear it seemed an undue hardship to make the
creditors rather than the debtor pay the piper.
No. 0535 admitted that excessive use of liquor caused the ruin of
his business. Due to his gross inattention the business dwindled away.
He got to work late and left early. The efforts of his family to run it
for him failed. His merchandise creditors had claims of $1400. He had
no non-exempt assets with which to pay them.
The amendment of the statute along the lines of the English
Act to provide an administrative discretion in respect to this
occasional case seems desirable.
Previous Failures
As seen above, according to § 14 of the Act a discharge shall be
refused if it appears that the bankrupt has been granted a dis-
charge within the preceding six years. How many "repeaters"
are there? What are their general characteristics?
As indicated below in Tables II and III, there were among
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the 910 Boston bankrupts 87 individual proprietors, laborers,
clerks, salesmen, etc., who had failed previously and eleven "one
man" corporations whose stockholder had failed previously. This
total of 98 of such bankrupts is 10.8% of the entire number of
Boston cases studied.
In all but two of the assignments was the bankrupt released
of all of his claims by the creditors, and in only eight of the
cases was there a previous bankruptcy without a discharge. In
four of the eight cases it appeared that the bankrupt or his
lawyer neglected to make application in time; in one that a
creditor had opposed successfully the application for discharge
on grounds of fraud. In the remaining three the banlupt had
made no application and there were collateral circumstances that
indicated the existence of grounds which might have led to its
refusal if application were made.
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The percentage of previous failures among the New Jersey
bankrupts was only 3.3% (20 out of 597). As noted in Tables
IV and V below, all of the cases where there was a previous
failure were bankruptcies of those engaged in business, no
laborers being present. In all cases of previous assignments,
which were almost twice the number of previous bankruptcies,
the debtor had been released of prior claims. No prior bank-
ruptcies without discharges were found.




Business One Prior Discharge One Prior Assignment Total
Retailers 4 5 9
Manufacturers 1 2 3
Contractors 1 4 5
Total 6 11 17




Prior Bankruptcy- Prior Assignment
Business Individual Proprietor Individual Proprietor Total
Retailer 2 2
Realtor 1 1
Total 2 1 3
The above tables are interesting not only as showing a sur-
prisingly large percentage of "repeaters" but also as indicating
the use of the "one man" corporation. It will be noted that
after the first failure the corporate device was employed in ten
of the Boston and New Jersey cases. In four of the Boston cases
the previous failure of the "one man" corporation was followed
by the formation of a new corporation. The longest succession
of such corporations was in the case bf the wholesaler who had
become incorporated three times and failed as often. (See Table
III.)
Table VI shows the length of time since the previous failure
or, if there were two or more prior failures, the time since the
last preceding one.
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LENGTH OF TIME SINCE LAST PREVIOUS FAILURE
No. of Years
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The mean for the Boston cases was 10.2 and for the New
Jersey 9.5. Twenty-nine Boston cases and nine New Jersey cases
had a previous failure in six years preceding the present bank-
ruptcy. Those 38 cases constituted 35o (38 out of 106) of all
the cases from both districts on which there were data. Those
















The other six of the 38 cases were "one man" corporations.
In two of the cases the stockholder had received a discharge
within the previous six years; in three cases another "one man"
corporation owned by the same stockholder had received a dis-
charge; and in one case the stockholder had made an assign-
ment. Under existing rules of law recognizing the validity of
the "one man" corporation as a device for securing limited lia-
bility2 the fact that the stockholder or another corporation
owned by the stockholder had received a discharge within the
six preceding years would not be a bar to a discharge of an-
25 See Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924);
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd., [1897] A. C. 22; Louisville Banking Co.
v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531' (1893); Douglas and Shanks, In-


















other subsequently organized corporation. In none of these "one
man" corporation cases did any facts appear which would justify
a court in disregarding the corporate entity and treating the
stockholder as an individual proprietor.20
As respects the other twenty cases where a discharge had
been received within six years prior to the filing of the peti-
tion there are twelve in which the time element alone might
not bar another discharge. This is due to the fact that the six
year period in § 14 is measured not from the date of the prior
discharge to the filing of a second petition but either from the
date of the pribr discharge to the date of the second,7 or from
the date of the prior discharge to the date of the application
for the second,28 the cases on this point being in conflict. Hence
in twelve of the twenty cases it is possible that another dis-
charge could be claimed as a matter of right, at least if applica-
tion for discharge was made after the six year period, no other
grounds for refusal appearing. As a prior assignment is no
grounds for refusal of a discharge whether or not a release has
been given, it follows that in only eight of the 38 cases does it
affirmatively appear that a discharge would be barred by § 14
(b) (5) if creditors objected.
What manner of persons are these "repeaters"? The answer
is that they represent all types of bankrupts. To write their
case histories would be to write of factors appearing and recur-
ring throughout the entire group of 1,500 bankrupts studied.
That will not be attempted here. But for the purpose of con.
sidering the functional aspects of § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act
these'118 cases might be grouped in certain general categories.
These classifications do not purport to be discriminating in an
analysis of causal factors but merely sketch in charcoal certain
dominant characteristics. In the first place are the cases of
misfortune. Of the entire group of 118 cases, thirteen (or 11%)
fell under this category. Of the 38 cases where there had been
a previous failure during the last six years two came within
this group; and of the twenty cases where a discharge had
26 Cf. Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Wenban
Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924) ; Erkenbrecher v.
Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921).
No special investigation of these "one man" corporations, however, was
made along that line. The continual use of these "one man" corporations
by "repeaters" raises problems susceptible perhaps of special treatment. It
may be that additional supervision will have to be provided by incorporating
states at the organization stage. Certain it is that they raise peculiar
problems requiring serious attention in any comprehensive program for
more effective social control of "repeaters."
27 In re Skinner, 298 Fed. 606 (Ga. 1924).
2SIn re Rubin, 259 Fed. 607 (1). N. J. 1919), decided by the Dlstrict




been granted within the preceding six years there was one. This
group includes almost without exception cases where the cost
of medical care or the illness of the bankrupt were the main or
a major factor in the bankruptcy. The following case is typical:
Mechanic No. 0737-making $40.00 a week up to the spring of 1931-
had received his discharge in bankruptcy twenty years earlier as a plumb-
ing and heating contractor. His first wife died seven years ago, leaving
four children and her father and mother. The latter were invalids and
from time to time were in a hospital for the insane at his expense. At the
time of his first wife's death he agreed to support her mother and father
for life in exchange for the dwelling house on which he assumed the mort-
gage. The children were totally dependent on him until they married a few
years ago. The daughters ran the house very uneconomieally. The father-
in-law died. The debtor remarried. He tried hard but was unable to keep
up the payments on the mortgage, to pay doctors' bills and funeral ex-
penses and to meet the bills his dependents had incurred. His wages were
attached and he lost his job in May, 1931. He owed $7,200 with an equity
in the house of $3,900. $5,000 was owed on the mortgage, Q300, to retailers,
$400 to doctors.
Secondly, there are the cases of spce zdation, gambling and
gross extravagance. There were 13 of the 118 cases (111) in
this group. Of the 38 cases of previous failure in the preceding
six years there were eight. And of the twenty cases where a
discharge was granted within the six preceding years there were
four. These cases are fairly represented by the other cases dis-
cussed above under speculation, gambling and extravagance.
They were of all degrees and kinds. Under extravagance were
included only those cases where there was some evidence of
fraudulent intent or where the extravagance was gross and
wholly unjustifiable.
Thirdly, there are the cases of fraud. Of the 118 cases there
were sixteen (14%). Among the 38 cases of previous failures
within the preceding six years there were three; and of the
twenty cases where a discharge was granted within the pre-
ceding six years there were three. The patterns of facts em-
braced in this category are as varied as human ingenuity. Most
of them, however, have been rather standardized over the cen-
turies and though the details vary the type is usually readily
recognized. A few examples are:
Manufacturer No. 0840-a "one man" corporation established for twenty
years failed owing $31,000 with assets of $4,000. The failure was due
primarily to diversion of funds by the owner in fox farming which proved
unsuccessful All of the debts owed are for claims in connection with the
manufacturing enterprise.
No. 0311 was the case of a retail shoedealer tinged with fraud through-
out. In the same line of business he failed twice before-1913 and 1917-
each time making an assignment for the benefit of creditors. A few months
before bankruptcy he had given a financial statement showing $8,000 in
stock and annual sales of $31,000. On examination he gave his sales as
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$18,000. Shortly after giving the above statement his stock was sold at
public auction and purchased by his son for $1,200. It seemed fairly clear
that he sold most of his stock at any price and gave the money to his son
so as to buy back the business, It further appeared that during the past
few years he had taken money from the business to purchase real estate in
his wife's name. His total liabilities were $9,800, most of which was owed
wholesalers. His assets .were the $1,200 of stock.
Retailer No. 0129 owned and operated a furniture store with sales of
$60,000 a year, 20% of which were cash and 80% deferred payment.
Credit losses for the past year were estimated at $24,000 (50%)-cnough
in itself to cause bankruptcy. Turnover of receivables was 1.3 yearly to
sales. This implied ineffective collection. Rent was $800 a month or 16%
of total sales. This too was extremely high. No inventory was ever taken
though the business was conducted over three years. Very few books
were kept. Business was commenced with $10,000, all being provided by
the owner without borrowing. He had been discharged in bankruptcy
eighteen years previously as a partner in another business. His assets
schedule were $52,500 of which 89% were accounts receivable. These assets
realized $7,000. Liabilities" were $112,000. The bankrupt indicated keen
competition, business depression, inability to get credit as the cause of
failure. Creditors indicated dishonest business methods, lack of capital
and too liberal extension of credit. Four months prior to bankruptcy this
retailer gave out a statement to creditors that he had assets of $100,000
and was clearly solvent. In fact he was not. Some property had been
acquired in his wife's name. At the time of this study he was managing a
store for his wife which she had just opened in her own name.
No. 186 was a "one man" corporation organized with a paid-in capital
of $2,000 engaged in a retail radio business. The sole stockholder had
gone through bankruptcy in 1911 while engaged in a similar retail busi-
ness. At the end of the first six months he issued a financial statement
to R. G. Dun & Co. over his own signature, showing a net worth of
$4,000; at the end of the year another showing a net worth of $5,000 and
a few months before bankruptcy another giving assets as $16,000, liabilities
as $4,500 and the net worth as $11,500. In a year and a half after begin-
ning business a petition was filed. The assets then were $13,000 and the
liabilities $19,000. No possible explanation appears for such radical change
in the last few months. It seems that the company was insolvent during
the greater part of its existence.
Finally, there was the retailer, No. 66, who was discharged nine years
ago, reentered business in a different line two years ago and now turns
up in bankruptcy under a different name. His creditors were duped.
The cases in the above three groups represent only the mi-
nority. There remain 75 of the total of 118 cases (64%) ; 24 of
the 38 cases where there was a previous failure within the pre-
ceding six years; and twelve of the twenty cases where a dis-
charge had been granted in the previous six years. All of the
balance of these cases involve apparently honest persons fighting
a losing battle against a militant economic order. In an analytical
study of the causes of failure they would have to be separated
into many classes. They include the morons, the incompetent
and the misfits. They embrace cases of insufficient capital, ill-
proportioned capital structures, insufficient mark-ups, over ex-
tension of credit, poor credit management, poor location, failure
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to carry insurance, excessive overhead, etc. They represent at
best the marginal entrepreneur who under our present order is
under but few legal restraints in entering business and very
little legal control after entering. Their analysis will be re-
served for other articles. No attempt will be made to set forth
here even representative cases. Only a few random samples
are chosen.
No. 0882 during the last twenty-five years had been in banlruptcy once
as a retailer of tobacco, and had failed in a cleaning and pressing busi-
ness once and as a retail clothier once. This time he had been dabbling
in insurance and real estate, earning about $40.00 a week. His reduced
income followed the slump in real estate and he came into bankruptcy
this time owing $8,500 (mostly on mortgages) with assets of $10 (con-
sisting of an automobile which he had purchased a year earlier for $:,5
cash). His trouble was congenital.
No. 0891 was a manufacturer previously organized as a corporation
which after one year's existence went into bankruptcy in 1924. A year
later he reentered the same business this time as an individual proprietor
with a capital of $1,000 which he provided without borrowing. Due to the
previous failure of the corporation he had to pay cash for his materials
or a premium for credit. Due to lack of capital he had to buy on credit.
To meet his bills payable he was forced to discount his receivables at
a high rate. Apparently his business was never on a paying basis. He
struggled along, however, for four years with the financial assistance
of a generous relative, until the stock market crash in 1929 wiped out
the latter. Shortly thereafter the business was abandoned and the peti-
tion filed. The debts were $7,800 and the assets $700. All but about $2,500
was owed the generous relative.
No. 0895 was the case of a corporation engaged in manufacturing, all
of the stock being owned by two men in equal amounts. One of these had
failed a few years previously in a similar line of business. Practically all
of the capital ($14,000) was furnished by the two organizers without
borrowing. The business was not unsuccessful but after a year and a half
the two stockholders quarreled over management policies. One brought
an action in equity against the other to restrain him from certain acts.
The other fied a cross bill. While this action was pending creditors be-
came uneasy and to protect their interests petitioned the corporation into
bankruptcy. Its debts were $4,400. Its assets were sold at auction to
a corporation organized by one of the stockholders (the one who had failed
previously) for $4,000, the funds being furnished by friends. At the time
of the investigation that corporation was being operated successfully.
Case No. 0896 was a jobber, 42 years old, who had been in the same
line of business for twenty years. Up to 1919 he operated as an individual
proprietor. In that year he failed settling with his creditors for 45%.
Then he formed a corporation owning all the stock except for qualifying
shares. That corporation went into bankruptcy in 1923. Another corpora-
tion was former in 1923, this likewise being a "one man" corporation. This
went into bankruptcy in 1926. Thereupon another such corporation was
formed lasting until 1928, when it was reorganized and still another cor-
poration was formed, this jobber again having all the stock except qualify-
ing shares. This corporation was organized with capital of $3,000 all
furnished by' friends and relatives. After two years it came into bank-
ruptcy. The jobber himself likewise filed a petition. His personal obliga-
tions were $5,600 and his assets $100. The corporation had only nominal
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assets with liabilities of $9,700. About half of the personal liabilities
arose out of endorsements of notes for the accommodation of the cor-
poration. It appeared that since the earlier failures the jobber never
had a bank credit. All o f his credit business was done on drafts attached to
bills of lading. The practice of the jobber was to discount these drafts
with private individuals at rates of 2% or more a month. No element
of fraud appeared. The insufficiency of capital and limited credit facili-
ties gave him such a handicap that the small margin of profit and keen
competition forced the business into insolvency almost at the start.
Wholesaler No. 0614 failed in a different wholesale business in 1911 and
received his discharge. He had been in the present business three years.
All of his capital, $15,000, was obtained on loans from banks. Duo to
defective machinery the plant had to close down for a short period result-
ing in cancellation of $8,000 of orders. Suit against the vendor of the
machinery was dismissed. For three years the debtor struggled along.
Additional loans of $10,500 had to be secured from other sources. $12,600
remained on the original indebtedness to the bank. Further credit was
refused. The cost of doing business on borrowed capital was so great and
the pressure of these creditors so severe that a voluntary petition was
filed. There was no opportunity to build up a reserve and when prices
dropped and the depression increased all margin of profit disappeared.
Aside from the bank loans there was $31,000 owing manufacturers. The
assets were $2,650. A ten per cent settlement was offered a month before
bankruptcy and was accepted by all but one creditor whose claim was
for $2,800.
On the basis of the above data is there justification for treat-
ing all cases of prior discharge alike? The only discrimination
shown in § 14 is between six year old discharges and all dis-
charges granted earlier. But the fact remains that within the
six year deadline are found cases of all sorts and varieties.
Though all of the examples given are not of cases within the
six year group they are truly representative of such cases.
Should the administrative procedure under the Bankruptcy Act'
be so rigid as to be forced to disregard basic differences in types
of such cases? Should the cases of misfortune be treated the
same as cases of speculation, gambling or gross extravagance?
Should the case of the moron be treated the same as the case
of the retailei who found his receivables uncollectible due to
a textile strike? The problem is not peculiar to cases of "re-
peaters." It is made perhaps only somewhat more acute in such
cases. P-rima facie it would seem that discharges should be dis-
pensed in light of, not in disregard of, basic differences in types
of failure. The administrative procedure should be designed to
permit an adjustment to the requirements of individual cases.
An attack along that line would result at least in a discrimina-
tion between types of cases falling within the six year dead
line and would vest in the administrator discretion to deny, grant
conditionally or unconditionally, or to suspend the discharge in
all such cases.
Further, it might well result in eliminating the six year period.
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It will be noted that the English Act eliminates entirely the time
element and makes it possible to deny, suspend or grant, can-
ditionally or unconditionally, the discharge if at any previous
time the applicant has been adjudged a bankrupt. That discards
the arbitrary feature of our six year period and by the same
token permits greater individualized treatment.
In addition, what justification is there for differentiating be-
tween the case where a discharge previously has been given in
bankruptcy and where the debtor has been released by his
creditors voluntarily without the intervention of-the state? It
will be noted that the English Act specifies not only a prior
adjudication but also a prior composition or arrangement. There
are many devices for liquidating estates. Bankruptcy is only
one of them. Are not the phenomena for social control recurring
failures rather than a recurring type of liquid0tion or adjust-
e'nnt of failures? It will be seen from Tables II-V inclusive,
supra, that of the 118 cases of previous failure there were 32
cases of prior assignments, or excluding "one man" corporations,
28. In most of these the debtor was previously released. As
those cases realistically were failures the reason why they should
be treated differently under the discharge section is not at all
obvious. It might be argued that for the state to give special
dispensation in the form of a discharge is onething; for creditors
to release voluntarily is another. On the other hand, if the gov-
ernment desires, through bankruptcy, to effect control over, and
provide deterrents to, recurring failures, it might well be argued
that the discharge section should be revised, or at least re-
examined, with that end in view. The result well might be a
revision along the lines of the English Act.
Data on the English cases of previous failure are of interest at
this point.29 Of the 5,685 applications for discharges dealt with
during the years 1924-1929 inclusive, in 480 cases (8.A) it
was reported and not disproved that the bankrupt had previously
been adjudged a bankrupt or made a composition or arrange-
ment with his creditors. In what portion of the 8.4% of
English cases the discharge was granted, conditionally or uncon-
ditionally, denied, or suspended does not appear. But in view
of the small percentage of all of those cases in which the dis-
charge was denied or granted unconditionally, it seems reason-
able to infer that the conditional grant or suspension was used
in some of these cases as in cases of other types, The percentage.
of previous failures among 1he 1,500 New Jersey and Boston
cases-the only data available for this country-was substan-
tially the same as in the English cases-10.8% for Boston; 3.7%
for New Jersey; and 7.8% for the combined groups.
29 These were compiled from the annual reports of the Board of Trade
for the years 1924-29, inc.
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In considering the problem of social control through bank-
ruptcy of recurring failures certain other aspects have some
direct bearing. First is a comparison of the business or occupa-
tion in which these bankrupts were engaged at the time of their
present and previous failure. In the case of the business group
about 66% of the bankrupts (63 out of 96 for both Boston and
New Jersey, including the "one man" corporation) had failed
previously while engaged as entrepreneurs in the same line of
business. Further, in 29% of these cases (28 out of 96) they
had failed previously while engaged as proprietors or owners
in a different line of business. In only about 5% of the cases
(5 out of 96) had they been laborers, clerks, salesmen, etc., at
the time of their first failure. The cases of the 22 laborers,
clerks, salesmen, etc., are interesting as they show a decided
trend away from entrepreneurial activity after the first failure.
Fourteen of the 22 had previously failed as proprietors of the
same kind of business in which they were employed at the time
of this b~nkruptcy. The balance had failed previously as em-
ployees. The problem of the "repeater" then pertains for the
most part to cases where the second failure results from the same
activity as the first.
In the second place, it is observed that these repeaters (not
including professional men, laborers, clerks, salesmen, etc.) had
no greater mortality as respects the length of time in the busi-
ness which failed than the entire group of bankrupts studied.
The mean for these cases was somewhat less than the mean
for all the bankrupts-5.9 for the 66 Boston cases as contrasted
to 7.2 for all Boston cases; and 6.1 for the nineteen New Jersey
cases as contrasted to 8.1 for all New Jersey cases. But the
difference vanishes on comparison of medians, Here it is about
.4.5 for all of the cases. In other words, the bankrupt who has
failed before struggles along and stays out of bankruptcy about
as long as his brethren who have not failed previously.
Relevant to the problem of more effective control over "re-
peaters" is the question of who financed them in this last enter-
prise. The following data was.obtained for the business cases
in the group of 118 previous failures:
New Jersey: Boston:
% of % Pf
Source of Capital total capital total capital
Owner, without borrowing ............ 18.4% 77.5%
Friends and relatives ................. 19.9 4.6
Life insurance ...................... 3.7 4
Commercial banks ................... 32.1 6.9
Finance companies ................... 18.4 6
Wholesalers, jobbers and manufacturers 5.5 .9
Fixtures, on instalment .............. 2 3.7
Total ......................... 100% 100%
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The difference between the New Jersey and Boston cases is
striking. Whereas in Boston the owner and his friends and
relatives furnished over 80% of the capital, in New Jersey they
furnished less than 40%. The average capital of the Boston
cases was $4,215, the average for New Jersey $9,030. That
may mean that the New Jersey cases were larger and more
extensive enterprises. On the other hand, it may reflect in part
an ease in getting credit in New Jersey. The analysis of that
and allied questions will be postponed for later articles. The
point of the data' here is merely to suggest their relevancy to
the broad problem of social control over recurring failures. Here
again, as in the cases discussed above relative to the financing
of business by creditors, if the situation generally is similar
to that in the New Jersey cases, the part which bankruptcy
administration is playing or can play in controlling such phe-
nomena may be small. If credit agencies are making it easy for
"repeaters" to try again, perhaps bankruptcy should not tighten
up for the benefit of those who are in a position to control the
situation more effectively. Obviously these data cannot furnish
the basis for an answer. All they can do is to suggest a method
of attack and supply leads for further inquiry.
What has been said concerning previous failures and the part
bankruptcy can or should play in respect to them is not peculiar
to that type of case. It applies as well to all cases of failure.
What the function of bankruptcy is, or can or should be, is
answerable only after careful examination and analysis of the
total situation against which and in relation to which it operates.
As stated in the beginning of this essay such examination would
be as extensive and intensive as the life which bankruptcy
touches and affects. Further exploration of the data will be made
in subsequent articles. It will suffice if as a result of that ex-
ploration other functional aspects of bankruptcy can be made
more articulate.
Co'iwlwsoins
In summary are the following specific suggestions for considera-
tion in revising § 14 of the Bankruptcy Act:
(1) Granting to the court or other official who dispenses dis-
charges discretion to deny, grant (conditionally or uncon-
ditionally) or suspend them so as to avoid the rigidity of
the present limited alternatives and to effectuate an ad-
ministrative flexibility susceptible of nicer adjustments to
the requirements of individual cases.
(2) Establishing, as additional grounds for administering dis-
charges in that manner,
(a) Failure to keep accounting records as are usual and
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proper in the particular business and as sufficiently
disclose the business transactions and financial position;
(b) Speculation or gambling (not incidental to br inherent
in the particular business) which directly caused or
contributed to the failure;
(c) Contracting debts without having at the time reason-
able grounds of expectation of being able to pay them,
with the additional proviso that only cases of prima
facie fraudulent intent and gross and wholly unjusti-
fiable extravagance be included;
(d) Culpable neglect of business;
(e) Previous failure, at whatever time and irrespective of
the method of liquidation then employed.
(3) Limiting the operation of the discharge in respect to claims
for personal or property damage arising out of automobile
accidents.
